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TV Urgente
Urban Exclusion, Civil Society,
and the Politics of Television in Venezuela
John Patrick Leary

“Aqui no hay barrios” (There are no barrios here) was what real estate
agents told me when they showed me apartments in one of the middle-class
zones of eastern Caracas, to assure me that the slum districts that house
roughly half of the city’s population, called barrios in Venezuela, were safely
distant. Shortly after I arrived in the country, a security official at the U.S.
Embassy warned me never to travel into the slums. “The people there are
so desperately poor,” he insisted earnestly, “that they’ll rob your shoes,
your shirt, your eyeglasses, your belt — and that’s if you get out alive.” The
barrios are often identified in everyday conversations like these as a kind of
cancer on the city, pouring bodies into and draining resources out of the
valley of Caracas. Caracas’s slums have been steadily growing since the
1950s, but in the 1990s, their population surged alongside the marginal
quarters of Bogotá, Lima, and the other outsized metropolises of Latin
America. But in Venezuela this constituency has succeeded in leveraging its
local energies into a national political movement. In a country where over
85 percent of the population lives in cities, the radical social-democratic
government of Hugo Chávez has counted largely on barrio residents for its
base of support.1 The politics of media and journalism, moreover, have
played a uniquely prominent role in the class conflict that has occupied
Venezuelan society for the last six years. On both the right and left, the
airwaves have become a critical theater in the political and social conflict
of a divided nation.
This study will concentrate on the politics of representation in contemporary Venezuelan television news and documentary, which in its
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dominant mainstream forms have produced an urban imaginary that
models national citizenship on the geographic, class, and racial divisions
of the Venezuelan metropolis. The country’s political conflict demands
careful attention from scholars, activists, and media workers confronting the concentration of media ownership, cultural capital, and even
urban populations themselves in a moment that presents both unprecedented technological possibilities for popular television and cinema and
unmatched unfreedom in the official media sector. As Latin America, and
the world, become majority-urban societies for the first time in history, the
power of popular media to mobilize populations has arguably never been
greater. In Venezuela, one barrio-based television station, Catia TVe, with
the recent assistance of the Chávez government, has created an alternative
television model that both reflects the radical possibilities and exposes
some of the limitations of the Venezuelan political experiment. Catia TVe’s
political objective is to raise popular consciousness, as radical avant-garde
movements before them have done. However, it also aims to revise the
old vanguardism. Instead of simply “developing the taste of the masses,”
as the Cuban cinema of the 1960s sought to do, Catia TVe claims to put
the masses behind the cameras, in a “participatory” model of television
production that mirrors the chavista ideal of participatory democracy,
an antibureaucratic democratic ideal that proposes to devolve power and
statecraft to local populations. At the same time, this radical appeal confronts a conservative media industry that has generally transcended the
authoritarianism of its predecessors. Although Venezuela’s private TV
has by no means abandoned the traditional appeals to patria, public order,
and anticommunism, the alternative to chavista radicalism now wears a
distinctly liberal, up-to-date costume — that of “civil society.”
Catia TVe is an over-the-air UHF station based in Catia, the popular
name for a large part of impoverished west Caracas, where almost all of its
staff and volunteers live. The station’s programming consists of studio chat
shows and digital video documentaries on neighborhood organizations,
cultural life, and local history in Caracas’s working-class communities. Its
name contains a pun on the Spanish verb ver, “to see”: pronounced Catia
Te Ve, or “Catia Sees You,” the station’s name proclaims to its viewers
that they are indistinguishable, at least in theory, from its producers. The
station’s ubiquitous slogan, “No vea televisión, hagala” — Don’t watch
television, make it — emphasizes that Catia TVe’s principal interest lies
in transforming the means of television production, rather than altering
the consumption of televised images. The station carefully tracks the
neighborhoods where its broadcast signal reaches, but Catia TVe staff do
not attempt to quantify their viewing audience — training producers is their
priority instead. The station’s life as a licensed broadcaster began in 2001,
after the Venezuelan constituent assembly passed a landmark telecommu26
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nications law in June 2000 that granted broad legal recognition to community broadcasters. In order to qualify as a “community” broadcaster,
70 percent of a station’s programming must be produced from within a
particular geographically defined community, and the station must provide training and airtime to local citizens, who may not be clergy, party
officials, or military officers. This law has made Venezuela’s airwaves some
of the most open in the world for low-watt and neighborhood radio and
television broadcasters. (Caracas also has dozens of low-watt radio stations,
most of them located in the barrios, where population density makes even
weak signals very effective.) Because of its speedy growth and its place in
the national capital, the flashpoint of the national political conflict, Catia
TVe has since become the unofficial leader in a national network of local,
partisan television stations in Venezuela — from one of the first, TV Rubio,
in a small Andean mountain village, to urban stations like TV Lara in the
barrios of Barquisimeto.
Catia TVe is distinguished by its organizational structure, which is
built around what it calls Equipos Comunitarios de Producción Audiovisual Independiente (Independent Community Audiovisual Production
Teams), or ECPAIs. Catia TVe’s ECPAIs — there are approximately two
dozen — are groups of anywhere from two to six people charged with
scripting, filming, and editing the station’s programming, using handheld
digital camcorders, Macintosh computers, and Final Cut editing software
provided by the station. The station mandates that every volunteer complete a rigorous orientation course on filmmaking techniques and film form
before joining the station. The ECPAIs produce the vast majority of the
programming with a minimal amount of editorial control from the station’s
central staff, and they are the center of Catia TVe’s double communicational and pedagogical mission. The station produces a wide variety of
programming this way, from documentaries on local political movements
to public service announcements to cultural reportage with no explicitly
partisan content. For example, ECPAI Yaowe, which operated until 2006,
was organized by a small team of students from the Armando Reverón
School of Art, down the street from Catia TVe. Yaowe chronicled the
folk histories and myths of Caracas’s barrios and the surrounding coastal
communities. Its project, said Julio Loaiza, a member, was to assemble
“oral history as a resource for the reconstruction of the collective memory
of the community in Cota 905, Guzman Blanco barrio.”2 Two programs
explored an unlikely story, given the dense urban setting: the residents’
secret histories of their neighborhood’s beleaguered natural landscape. In
El Pino: Cota 905, neighbors recounted their stories of a long-dead pine
tree, known as “el Pino,” that was known to harbor malevolent spirits.
Even after it was cut down, the local story goes, the same supernatural
forces stubbornly continued to haunt the street where it once grew. Another
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Figure 1. The “Arbol de los peluches” (stuffed-animal tree) in the 23 de enero (23rd of January)
barrio. Behind the tree are brick ranchos built by their inhabitants both on available land and on top
of already existing houses. In the upper left is one of the public housing projects from the 1950s in
the area, a relic of a different era in working-class housing. ECPAI Yaowe, El arbol de los peluches,
Catia TVe, 2006. Courtesy of Catia TVe.

similar program investigated a curious landmark in the 23 de enero barrio: the “arbol de los peluches” (stuffed-animal tree), a shade tree hung
with dozens of plush children’s toys over the years for reasons that no one
quite recalls. 3 In Timbores de Guayabal, Yaowe left Caracas for the fertile
Barlovento coast, which lies some fifty miles east of Caracas along rocky
mountain roads. There, shortly after the village’s anniversary celebrations
of slave emancipation in Venezuela, Loaiza recorded a public rehearsal of
the African drumming troupe of Guayabal, a small riverside village that
was founded by fugitive slaves from the coastal chocolate plantations.
(Guayabal, too, has its own fledgling local station, Tele Cimarrón, named
after the Spanish word for an escaped slave or “maroon.”) Meanwhile,
ECPAI Mente colectiva (Collective Mind) reported on Catia’s elaborate
Carnival floats, and ECPAI Bienvenidos a nuestro barrio (Welcome to Our
Barrio) interviewed residents of a neighborhood named Casalta about a
government affordable housing program. Visual style and levels of technical expertise vary from show to show: Bienvenidos a nuestro barrio, for
example, favors the scene “wipes” familiar to home videographers every28
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Figure 2. A young boy studies the drummers of Guayabal during an impromptu performance in
the village school. ECPAI Yaowe, Timbores de Guayabal (Drums of Guayabal), Catia TVe 2006.
Courtesy of Catia TVe.

where, and its affable host at one point accepted the hospitality of a Casalta
family he was interviewing by holding a coffee cup up to the handheld
camera and tipping it back, as if drinking through the lens. Yaowe, on the
other hand, photographed and composed its subjects with careful attention
to avant-garde visual style.
Catia TVe has grown impressively during the Chávez years, when
it moved from a volunteer effort run out of a room in Caracas’s National
Library to a funded organization with a staff of thirty. In 2003, the station
moved into a renovated nineteenth-century railroad warehouse in Catia
donated by the city government. As in many small, community-based
organizations, its growth has not been painless. Some ECPAI members
complain privately that Catia TVe has become too complacent in its community networking, distant from its base neighborhoods, unaggressive in
recruiting new members and new viewers, and newly bureaucratic. New
programming is irregular and increasingly infrequent, and the station
frequently rebroadcasts material produced by the national public channels.
Most volunteers, working people who are unpaid for their labor at the station, struggle with the burden of producing new programming. The station
traces its roots to a “cine-club” founded in 1992 by several residents of
Manicomio, a barrio in northwest Caracas near an old psychiatric hospital
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from which it takes its name (manicomio means “insane asylum” in Spanish). Cine-clubs began to appear in the 1960s across Venezuela to screen
and share Latin American films as well as locally produced material — “una
imagen propria” (an image of our own) marginalized by an ascendant global
mass culture. According to veterans of the cine-club movement, the Communist Party of Venezuela played a prominent role in these popular education and film programs, which inspired Catia TVe’s founders.4 Despite
these difficulties, Catia TVe’s emphasis on the production process and a
culture of what it calls “participation” has roots in both these politicized
neighborhood film clubs and the cine urgente movement of the 1960s, the
Venezuelan manifestation of the Latin American “Third Cinema” — the
left-wing, mainly documentary film movements that famously thrived in
Cuba, Brazil, and Argentina. The cine urgente proposed documentary as
a superior film form for demystifying the cinema and bringing the viewer
closer to the production process. Thirty years on, Catia TVe intends to
bridge this gap between the spectator and producer by remaking the production process itself.
1989: Year Zero

To historicize Venezuela’s contemporary political transformation, most historians point to the caracazo, the popular riots in 1989 against governmentimposed “structural adjustment” measures and the largest such mass
uprising in Latin America’s recent history.5 The riots began shortly after
Venezuela’s newly elected populist social democratic president, Carlos
Andrés Pérez, abruptly reversed campaign pledges to resist IMF-mandated
economic reforms and implemented a set of austerity measures barely a
month into his term (the sudden policy change was boldly named el gran
viraje: “the big turnaround”). The most immediate cause for the revolt
in Caracas, however, was sudden, steep raises in gas prices resulting from
the removal of price controls on gasoline, and the private bus companies’
speculative exploitation of fare increases, which fell hardest on the barrio
communities and working-class suburbs of Caracas. The demonstrations
and looting continued for days.6 The caracazo was put down by violent
military repression in the barrios that left anywhere from 277 (the official
number) to at least 1,000 dead. The 27th of February is now commemorated by the national government and local municipalities as a formative
national tragedy — “the day that changed Venezuela,” as the tagline of a
recent sentimental Venezuelan film about the revolt called it,7 or as one
west Caracas activist described it to me, “year zero of the Bolivarian
Revolution,” using the popular name for the radical political movement
in the country. The uprisings were an explosion of discontent from the
slums with Venezuela’s national political machine and the plain failures
30
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of its democratic pretensions, yet none of Venezuela’s left-wing political
parties anticipated, much less organized, the 1989 events — including the
nationalist officers’ movement that Chávez then led as a dissident army
officer. The 1989 uprisings signal, at the movement’s beginnings, the
distinctions between Chávez and chavismo that many critics overlook: the
movement that bears the president’s name emerged from a spontaneous
mass uprising that the future president himself never anticipated, and it
has retained a measure of that autonomy ever since. Although the Bolivarian Revolution is famously ambiguous ideologically — revolutionary
and third-worldist in much of its rhetoric and at its grass roots, but socialdemocratic in much of the state’s actual economic policy — the political
movement’s consistent antiparty and pro-barrio platform dates to the
saqueo popular (popular looting) of 1989.
Catia TVe places its own origins in 1989 as well. In the story customarily told to visitors, local residents took a looted and abandoned
government grocery store and transformed it into the Manicomio Casa
de Cultura (Culture House), where the station began. Its founders point
to the uprisings as a formative moment that underscored the need for an
autonomous broadcaster, since the caracazo was an event heavily mediated
by television. Images of looting occupied Venezuela’s television screens
throughout the riots, and the government’s attempts to manage the situation through televised propaganda revealed how ill equipped it was in
the face of popular rage. When the minister of the interior went on live
television on the afternoon of 27 February to announce a curfew, he was so
overcome by nerves that he could not deliver his speech. Disney cartoons
abruptly interrupted the broadcast of the suddenly helpless minister. 8
Later that day, President Pérez addressed the nation and announced the
imposition of martial law. As the violence spread, the president pleaded
with his constituents: “No one must forget that I only have twenty days
in government, this government that was born from the people and which
will be for the people. The people must have confidence that everything
will come out in a satisfactory way.”9 That same afternoon, Guillermo
Barrios, president of Pérez’s social democratic party Acción Democrática,
referred to the ongoing uprisings as a dangerous television event. The foreign media, Barrios complained, showed “the horror, the primitiveness” of
the looting in the capital. They showed “the entire world the other face of
Venezuela, the face of slums, of the hungry masses, of marginal people.”10
Yet while foreign media broadcast scenes of military violence against barrio
residents, domestic television concentrated on images of looting and suppressed the story of state repression that Acción Democrática later sought
to cover up. This domestic act of epistemic violence, then, compounded
the military brutality of those days, as the activists that founded Catia
TVe emphasized later.
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Barrios’s notion of television as an instrument of cultural instruction
and political order in an aspirant third-world nation like Venezuela raises
an important contradiction. Venezuela’s populist social-democratic party
could maintain this double discourse — between the oligarchic elitism of
Barrios’s disavowal of “the primitive” poor, and Pérez’s populist gesture to
the wisdom of the pueblo, or “the people,” the plebeian heroes of nationalist myth — because both positions contained a fundamental mistrust, and
no little fear, of what appeared to be a new, dangerous, and disobedient
population: the barrio. The inhabitants of this apparently “new” urban
geography — although by 1989 it was no longer terribly new — were seemingly cast out of the Venezuelan modernity of which Caracas itself was
once a showcase. They could therefore not be relied upon to simply “have
confidence that everything will turn out well,” as Pérez had instructed
them to. Such a people were not given to political rationality, either; they
could only “erupt like a volcano,” as Chávez opponent Teodoro Petkoff, the
ex-guerrilla, reformed Communist, and leader of the moderate left-wing
Movement Towards Socialism party (and now a prominent newspaper editor), said in a congressional address after the caracazo. The Venezuela that
“suddenly” erupted, Petkoff continued, “was not the Venezuela of workers
organized in trade unions or associations. No, it was another Venezuela, it
was the nonorganized Venezuela, the Venezuela that has been piling up in
a huge bag of wretched poverty.”11 Could such a “wretched” people really
be a part of el pueblo at all?
Catia TVe’s cofounder and longtime director, Blanca Eekhout,
described the significance of the caracazo in terms of the media accounts
that first stigmatized the poor as savage and then erased the repressive
violence the state employed against them: “I think that there was a break
in the confidence that the people could have in the media, in the possibility of believing in the world that they were selling. Now people knew that
there was no access to that world, and that was the break. So from there,
the need to have your own media, your own image grew up.”12 During the
moment of crisis that the caracazo presented, Eekhout argues, television
journalism abandoned the civic function most journalists claim in times
of social peace — when journalism, as what Thomas Carlyle called the
“fourth estate,” autonomously mediates the various interests of the state
and citizenry in a democratic system. Instead, says Eekhout, it took a
polemic stance as an informational apparatus of a repressive state. Today,
Venezuela’s class polarization remains visible on the nation’s television
screens. On one side, there is a cosmopolitan, middle-class Venezuela; on
the other, state channels and new community networks project a thirdworldist, mostly urban nation. Until 2008, the country had two state
channels and six privately owned stations available on national television;
the oldest of these, Radio Caracas Television (RCTV), has moved to cable
32
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following the Chávez government’s revocation of its broadcast license.
Venevisión, which exports programming all over the Hispanic world, is
controlled by the politically influential family of Gustavo Cisneros, scion of
a Cuban exile family that in the early 1960s parlayed a soft-drink fortune
into his new country’s nascent television industry. Like Venevisión, Televen
shows a mixture of news, game shows, and soap operas. Globovisión, a
twenty-four-hour news channel modeled on CNN en Español, went on
the air in 1995. Also available are an all-sports channel and a Catholic
Church – funded nature channel.
The polarization of Venezuelan television is perhaps nowhere more
pronounced than in the Sunday battles between Hugo Chávez’s weekly
call-in show, Aló Presidente (Hello, President), broadcast on state television,
and Globovisión’s six-day-a-week response, Aló Ciudadano (Hello, Citizen),
hosted by the charismatic Leopoldo Castillo, Venezuela’s ambassador
to the military government of El Salvador in the 1980s. Both programs
are hours-long and offer a simulated participatory format. On Chávez’s
largely improvised, often hours-long show — which treats a different topical
theme from a different location each week — the comandante is in absolute
control, despite the format’s performance of audience participation. On
the other hand, Castillo’s daily, two-hour-long program claims to offer a
more genuine audience participation through viewer polls, a text-message
crawl across the bottom of the screen, and supposedly unscreened phone
calls. Aló Ciudadano’s audience, callers, and studio guests are overwhelmingly anti-Chávez.13 Both programs ultimately have more in common than
they might acknowledge — they are utterly dominated by their stars, and
they are polemic, although some Globovisión officials, when pressed, still
maddeningly refuse to acknowledge their station’s obvious partisanship.
(“The government just doesn’t like bad news,” one producer blithely told
me when I asked about left-wing criticism of Globovisión’s reporting.)
Television, print, and radio media have been one locus of chavista
cultural policy, in large part because of a deep, sometimes visceral distrust by government partisans of the commercial broadcast media for its
antigovernment stance and, especially between 2000 and 2004, during the
height of the conflict between the government and its opposition, the television media’s often virulently abusive rhetoric. Luis Duno Gottberg has
described how the Venezuelan television and print media constructed an
image of “the masses” during this period as a racialized, irrational, and violent turba, or mob.14 In 2002, Carlos Ortega, then head of the oppositionaligned trade union federation, the Confederation of Venezuelan Workers
(CTV), appeared on Globovisión to discuss the “Bolivarian Circles,” the
pro-Chávez neighborhood organization named for Venezuela’s national
liberator, who were constantly rumored to be planning violent attacks on
east Caracas. “The terrorist circles, the violent circles that Chávez has
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armed, are going to take over the malls,” said Ortega. “They are going to
loot. They are going to kill, assassinate, massacre Venezuelans. That’s what
is planned for this country, that’s the project.”15 In referring to imminent
looting and violence by the chavista Bolivarian Circles — who served at this
time as the shorthand for the sum of all racial and class fears — Ortega
gestures to a memory of the caracazo as an explosion of barrio aggression.
On 27 February 2002, the thirteenth anniversary of the caracazo, the
well-known Televen journalist Marta Colomina described the circles —
“misnamed the Bolivarian Circles,” she added in the consistently vociferous, exclamatory tone that characterized her exhausting show, La Entrevista, “rather than the chavista circles” — as popular gangs plotting attacks
on anti-Chávez citizens. No details were provided.
After the April 2002 coup d’état that briefly overthrew Chávez,
many feared a return to the military rule and U.S. intervention that Latin
America had recently escaped.16 Many journalists on the left distinguished
the Venezuelan overthrow as a peculiarly modern “media coup” because of
the participation and endorsement of major broadcasters. These stations,
then, did not need to be taken over by the generals, as in other coups d’état,
but were enthusiastic allies from the beginning. The networks conducted
an information blackout of the popular rallies and the military dissenters
that demanded the return of the elected president, and some stations’ owners reportedly met with the short-lived president, Pedro Carmona, after
Chávez’s overthrow. After Venezolana de Televisión, the state channel, was
forced off the air, several networks aired cartoons and nature programs
while hundreds of thousands of mostly poor caraqueños, as residents of
Caracas are called, besieged the occupied presidential palace in protest,
an uncanny repetition of the caracazo episode when the minister of the
interior’s failed speech was abruptly replaced by Disney films. Maurice
Lemoine, writing in Le Monde diplomatique, attributed the coup’s success
largely to the uniform support of what he called, a bit hyperbolically, “hate
media.”17 Yet this analysis, like many media critiques on the left, overstates
the instrumental power of television’s ideological messages and social role
and attributes to the medium powers that it does not by itself possess in the
absence of popular protest and an organized military conspiracy. These
had developed over the previous three years of massive opposition mobilization. Other critics have pointed to television’s important auxiliary role in
organizing the anti-Chávez popular movements and its power to organize
social collectivities and define the terms of social exclusion. Television’s
political influence in Venezuela raises the vexed question of what, exactly,
is the political use of television. Is it, as many suggest, the most important
contemporary tool for defining social collectivities — the instrument of
the “modernization of citizenship,” as one Venezuelan communications
theorist puts it?18 Such claims about politics in the “TV age” show a hasty
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technological determinism that overlooks, or even deliberately obscures,
the lasting importance of movements, parties, civic participation, and
social networks. Chávez, after all, was restored to power in April 2002
mostly by mass pressure in the streets of Caracas, despite an unceasing
mass-media campaign against him before and during the coup. That is,
does not Chávez’s restoration to power in April 2002 rather show corporate
TV’s ultimately limited power to define the terms of political debate?
State and “Alternative” Media

Besides grassroots television efforts like Catia TVe and community
radio stations across the country, there are efforts at the state level to
counter the hostile commercial airwaves. The Venezuelan government
funded national television stations of its own, such as the traditional state
channel, Venezolana de Televisión, two new public broadcasters, and a
Caracas-based cable news network, Telesur, which is jointly funded by
the Venezuelan, Uruguayan, Argentine, and Cuban governments. The
government has also pursued legislative initiatives like the 2000 Telecommunications Act and the controversial 2003 Law of Social Responsibility
in Radio and Television, which aimed to establish “the social responsibility of the providers of radio and television services, advertisers, national
independent producers, and users, to foment the democratic equilibrium
between their duties, rights, and interests with the end of promoting
social justice and contributing to the formation of citizenship, democracy,
peace, human rights, culture, education, health, and social and economic
development of the Nation.”19 The law was initially heavily criticized by
the television networks, which ran frequent commercials during daytime
and evening hours calling it, with their own characteristic hyperbole, a
“gag law.” Human Rights Watch denounced the legislation as a threat to
press freedom, due to what it called the “subjective” nature of its strict
regulations against sexual material, violence, and other “unacceptable”
content. It went on to claim that the law’s imprecision on the definition
of inappropriate content would encourage so-called “self-censorship”
by broadcasters. 20 However, the most dire predictions of the law’s opponents have not been fulfilled. There have been no credible allegations
of censorship under the law, and its primary effects have so far been for
cultural-nationalist and puritanical ends. The law banned on-air cigarette and alcohol advertising, mandated hours for “family programming”
and government-produced commercials, and compelled radio stations to
devote 50 percent of their airtime to national artists.
Perhaps the most controversial media confrontation of Chávez’s
tenure came in May 2007, when the Venezuelan government refused to
renew the national broadcast license for RCTV, arguing that the station
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had transgressed the terms of its license by inciting rebellion during the
2002 coup. The station subsequently moved to cable TV, where it now
broadcasts as RCTV International. Its space on the public airwaves has
been replaced by TVes, a new state network with a name that mimics the
pun of Catia TVe’s name — the station is pronounced te ves, or “you see
yourself” — but is otherwise modeled on European state-funded “public” networks like the BBC. The government’s move against RCTV was
denounced in European and North American news outlets as an act of censorship. The decision was political in motive, of course — RCTV’s support
for the 2002 coup was well documented, and it was known as a platform
for anti-chavismo. RCTV was also embarrassed by a prominent whistleblower, Andrés Izarra, a senior producer who detailed the station’s policy of
procoup censorship during the April 2002 overthrow (Izarra later became
president of Telesur). In a recent article in The Nation, Daniel Wilkinson
characterizes the RCTV shutdown as punitive and politically motivated,
an episode that exemplified a central contradiction in the chavista project:
that between the participatory democratic ideals of the Bolivarian Revolution and the authoritarian personalism of Chávez’s own leadership style.
RCTV was not, as Wilkinson correctly notes, alone in continuing news
programming hostile to the government; nor was it alone in its enthusiasm
for the 2002 coup. With its license up for renewal, RCTV was, of course,
a target of opportunity for the government. The closure of RCTV briefly
galvanized Venezuela’s opposition, who were enraged by the provocation.
Few chavistas deny the political motive behind the license revocation;
control of the public airwaves, in this case, is an issue of revolutionary
sovereignty. RCTV, others pointed out, had itself practiced the censorship
of which the government now stood accused.21
Wilkinson does point out a crucial contradiction in chavismo that
extends to Venezuela’s media battles — the radical movement’s reliance
on its charismatic namesake. This contradiction is visible on Catia TVe,
which on the one hand embodies the radical democratic ethos of chavismo
in its aim to disseminate the means of media production to the urban
poor. On the other hand, as new ECPAI-produced programming remains
sparse and infrequent, more hours on the station’s airwaves are given
to rebroadcasting presidential speeches and national campaign slogans.
Despite these contradictions, the crucial distinction that Wilkinson clings
to in his piece on Chávez’s media politics — that between authoritarianism
and pluralism — would be rejected at Catia TVe. “Pluralism,” they say, is
a liberal ideal that fails to take into account structural economic inequities
that make true plurality impossible — what good is it, in other words, to
talk of the pluralism of six corporate giants?22 The revocation of RCTV’s
license was, perhaps, a strategic miscalculation by Chávez, as Wilkinson
asserts — a provocation that went too far, reviving a previously dispirited
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opposition instead of prodding it into overreaching as Chávez had successfully done before. The move opened a door previously closed to all
but the most partisan argument — that the Chávez government disrespects
opposition criticism and represses free speech. After the RCTV controversy, however, “free speech” could be defined not in terms of free access
to the means of media production, still mostly controlled by corporations
and the state in Venezuela, but rather in terms of the “freedom” of several
voices to speak as loudly as they always have.
Catia TVe’s relationship to the state has also been the source of some
controversy. At the station itself, funding — and not just state funding — has
brought with it a new hierarchy among paid employees and volunteer
ECPAI workers. In addition, the station’s ties to government have become
more visible onscreen since 2002. Aside from its donated headquarters,
grants from the telecommunications ministry and loans from PDVSA, the
national oil company, together provide a minority portion of its operating
costs. For some domestic critics, the station’s acceptance of such funding
raises the question of its independence, especially since a frequent critique
of private media in Venezuela is its fealty to conservative commercial and
political interests. Such critics, like El Nacional journalist Oscar Lucién,
have argued that Catia TVe’s pro-Chávez sympathies and its state funding compromise the station’s independence and its declared “community”
function. Shortly after an opposition-aligned mayor ordered a police raid
on Catia TVe’s transmitter in 2003, Lucién wrote, “Much has been said
of the poverty, not only technical but on the level of programming, of the
so-called community television and radio stations. [The] majority of them
have compromised their spirit and basic proposals to transform themselves
into uncritical cheerleaders for official policy, and their programming hides
an ugly official [oficialista] manipulation.”23 (One RCTV reporter put it
more crudely, in a well-publicized incident in which he charged a Catia
TVe reporter and broke his video camera at an opposition rally they were
covering: “Stop filming me, you spy, and tell your daddy Chávez to buy
you a new camera.”24)
Lucién’s criticisms of “oficialista manipulation” also echo the critiques of Venezuelan “populism” that are frequently made in the Venezuelan and U.S. press. Confusing “populism,” clientelism, and caudillismo
into a pathology of Latin American political underdevelopment, such
accounts present an image of a charismatic leader bypassing institutional
controls and dispensing largesse to key sectors that respond with loyalty
or choreographed gratitude. Mass-media representations of populism
frame the poor as passive objects of demagogic manipulation (the usual
implication, of course, is that wealthier citizens are too sophisticated to be
manipulated). Yet these critiques themselves seem so blinded by the light
of the comandante’s charisma that they cannot imagine that the “masses”
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might have the agency to condition or withdraw the support on which
Chávez’s political life rests. Used in this way, “populism” becomes shorthand for an underdeveloped political culture — an ordered, coherent system
of manipulation, rather than a contingent discourse or a set of political
practices, which subaltern groups can turn to their advantage and even help
to craft. 25 Yet the failure of a 2007 constitutional referendum promoted by
Chávez shows that the chavista masses are not simply obedient.
One example from the Venezuelan press demonstrates the erasure of
popular agency in mass-media representations of the “populist” political
subject: a front-page photo in El Mundo, an afternoon paper, shows a darkskinned man crouching in the crook of a tree. He gazes off to the distance
while meekly holding the Venezuelan flag; the caption identifies him as a
“government sympathizer” demonstrating outside congress in support of
the Movimiento Quinta República, Chávez’s old party (the current governing party is the newly formed Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela,
or the United Venezuelan Socialist Party). The text continues: “Just like
in the times of ancient Greece, the decisions will be made in the street,
except that in this session the representatives listened to the sovereign’s
slogans, and not his proposals.”26 The ironic reference to ancient Greece
underscores the caption’s caustic assessment of this plebeian “representative”: he is an instrument of his populist “sovereign” without political
desires or will of his own, capable only of an emotional response to the

Figure 3. An unidentified supporter of Hugo Chávez demonstrates outside the National Assembly in
Caracas. From the front page of El Mundo, Caracas, 7 June 2003. Courtesy of El Mundo.
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leader’s charisma or to his own humiliation — that is, an irrational political
subject mobilized by affect. 27
Catia
Barrios: Residential settlements of progressive development, constructed
through invasions of lands that do not belong to their residents, and which
without a plan, or more specifically, without a project, meet the same
requirements that any urban development built regularly in the same city
at the same time must meet.
— “III Inventario nacional de barrios: caracteristicas socioeconómicas de
las unidades de planifación física y las unidades de diseño urbano del area
metropolitana de Caracas,” FONDACOMUN, 1993

The rhetoric of exclusion exemplified by the El Mundo image and caption —
in which the leader is excoriated for his demagoguery and his supporters
for their due obedience — relies further still on the mass-media image of
the barrio that the crouching man implicitly also represents. However, the
“participatory” television of Catia TVe is reflective of a broad trend toward
a cultural and political revindication of the barrio that has accompanied
the rise of chavismo and its allied social movements. Catia TVe, television,
and politics in general in contemporary Venezuela cannot be explained
without understanding these movements and this new constituency. When
the last urban census was taken in 1993 by the official urban development organization FONDACOMUN, metropolitan Caracas was home to
2,685,901 people, of whom 1,085,543, or 40.4 percent, lived in barrios,
figures that make Venezuela’s capital relatively small by the new standards of third-world urban demography — metropolitan Mexico City, for
example, now shelters some 20 million inhabitants. As FONDACOMUN
makes clear, all barrios have been founded as illegal invasiones (invasions)
of public or private land “without a plan or a project”: in English they
would somewhat more obliquely be called “squatter settlements” (the
Spanish term retains more bluntly than our English phrase a sense of
legal and even moral transgression). Although the Venezuelan historical
literature on the subject is rather scarce, these “invasions” took off during the 1940s and 1950s, largely due to the effects of petroleum-based
capitalism, which crowded out domestic, particularly agricultural production by driving up the value of the national currency and making imports
cheap. Oil capitalism thus undermined Venezuela’s peasant agricultural
sector at the same time as it created tremendous urban employment in
the public works sector of the cash-rich state. During the dictatorship
of General Marcos Pérez Jiménez (1948 – 58), the use of oil revenues for
massive public works projects in Caracas and other Venezuelan cities
drew laborers to the expanding barrios. 28
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Central Caracas is built in a river valley within a range of mountains
that spans the central Caribbean coast of Venezuela, and the old city
center is surrounded by mountains to the north and smaller, steep hills
to the west, south, and east. As the city has grown, middle-class urbanizaciones (neighborhoods) have grown up on the valley’s eastern colinas
(hills), whereas barrios (poor neighborhoods) have spread to the cerros
(barrio hills) of the north, west, and far east — thus the economic divisions of the area have been linguistically codified in the city geography.
Between 1949 and 1971, the number of caraqueños living on the cerros
grew from 117,337 to 682,000. As the city has grown, many formerly
separate municipalities have been incorporated into the Distrito Federal.
Catia, the geographical area from which the television station takes its
name, cannot be found on any map. It is instead the popular name for
the area between the nineteenth-century working-class districts of Caño
Amarillo and La Pastora in the city center and the western limits of the
city today. Catia is a well-known place, but because of the informal nature
of the neighborhoods it contains, it is a highly ambiguous one: as one
Caracas historian puts it, Catia “es todo y es nada” (it is everything and
it is nothing). 29 Until as recently as the 1940s, sugarcane and coffee grew
on plantation land in much of the area now referred to as Catia. During
the urban boom of the 1940s and 1950s, the force and numbers of rural
migrants began to compromise these old titles by attrition. In 1946,
the Flores family, who owned much of the area, tried unsuccessfully to
evict some inhabitants of the newly settled Barrio Nuevo (New Barrio),
today one of Catia’s older neighborhoods. 30 The oil booms of the 1950s
and 1970s spurred the growth of Catia and the expansion of Caracas in
general, and much of Catia TVe’s work reflects an interest in the largely
unwritten history of neighborhoods that have undergone tremendous
transformation in only a few decades.
Catia’s historical ambiguity is appropriate since many barrio neighborhoods are often unmarked, or only approximated, on city maps and in
most cases have been considered illegal “invasions” of private or public
land. The irregularity of modern third-world slums, gradually built piecemeal by their inhabitants, is one of their principal defining characteristics
across countries and continents. Even as modern governments have abandoned the slums and their infrastructure to their inhabitants, they have
also seen in them the threat of ungovernability, as did earlier governing
regimes. For the urban reformers of nineteenth-century Britain and the
United States, the metropolitan tenements were dangerous bellwethers of
future disorder and despair. For those who chronicled this urban poverty,
the slums were also epistemologically impenetrable, except for those few
authors daring enough to venture into the city’s depths: “Deep are the
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‘Mysteries of London’ and so environed by difficulties that few can penetrate them,” wrote George Godwin in 1854. Already excluded from the city
proper, the impenetrable London slums were buried again in their literary
representation — they could only be accessed and interpreted through the
eyes of an expert outsider. This rhetorical tradition of elite commentary
on the ghetto mysteries of the European industrial city found its way into
American literature, as well, when Jacob Riis, the muckraking journalist,
took the readers of his best-selling book inside the New York slums of the
Lower East Side to see How the Other Half Lives (1890).
The large slum districts of the modern contemporary third world
recapitulate some of the same problems Riis saw in turn-of-the-century
New York — overcrowding, crime, inferior public services, unregulated
exploitation of labor, poor nutrition, and so on. Yet these newer districts,
largely built by residents themselves on claimed land, and rapidly growing
in spite of contracting urban labor markets, are part of a profound, even
epochal demographic shift under way in the third world today. 31 Catia
TVe is, therefore, one of the first efforts to document and represent this
transformation in formally new ways. Nevertheless, the representational
terms familiar to readers of the Victorian city fictions still appear in both
literary and state discourse around the barrio. In much of the material
generated by Venezuelan state reform organizations, the legal transgression
intrinsic to barrio expansion — so massive that after its initial phases it has
generally discouraged even the pretense of enforcement — is rephrased in
moral terms, in which the cordón de miseria is placed outside the norms of
civilized society much as English observers looked on the “rookeries” and
“fever nests” of nineteenth-century urban Britain as sites of moral and
physical degradation. In at least one case, a government institution threatened to turn this rhetorical practice of exclusion into a literal uprooting.
In the introduction to its 1963 report to the Acción Democratica government, the state’s Committee for the Rehabilitation of Barrios wrote, “Every
day, we see in the newspapers stories about crime, rapes, assault, etc., and
unfortunately these are committed by young men who come from or live in
these [barrio] districts. They do not recognize the law and act as if it does
not exist.”32 The committee was puzzled by residents’ insistence on staying
in barrio neighborhoods once the construction jobs that first drew them
disappeared; it could only desperately conclude that “they are stubborn and
have not wanted to return to the country.”33 The report concluded by recommending the “eradication of the barrios within 10 years,” through the
relocation of residents of neighborhoods deemed unsafe or beyond repair
to temporary camps in the Caracas suburbs, followed by demolition and
the construction of large-scale public housing (Manicomio, where Catia
TVe began, was on the list of neighborhoods to be demolished).
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The pharaonic plan never got far off the drawing board, however.
Besides its callousness — there is no suggestion that the residents to be
evicted should ever be consulted in the plan — the report exemplifies
deeper conflicts within Venezuela’s modern cultural and political history,
particularly in its telling reference to peasant naïveté. Venezuelan literature,
in particular, has generally charted social division and exclusion along the
geographic axis of city and country, a distinction that, in the early 1960s,
was transforming as the country moved to the city. Yet in government
reports like this, the barrio looks like the closest contemporary cultural
equivalent to the “barbarism” of Venezuela’s wild llanos (plains) in Romulo
Gallegos’s canonical novel of Venezuelan nationalism, Doña Barbara.
Written during the dictatorship of the military caudillo Juan Vicente
Gómez (1908 – 1935), Doña Barbara charted the nation along the lines of
the cultured city and the barbarous llanos, beyond the reach of the law.
Gallegos’s hero — a Caracas intellectual with the significant name Santos
Luzardo (Holy Light) — triumphantly resolves this intractable conflict in
his campaign against the despotic female landowner of the novel’s title.
The allegorical conflict between lettered city and lawless country reproduces the classic episteme of Latin American nationalist ideology, which
was defined by the struggle between civilization and “barbarism” in the
young republics. Today, however, the terms of this struggle have largely
ceased to be defined by a national geography — the divide of city and
countryside — and instead describe the urban imaginary of the contemporary nation of cities and slums.
This urban imaginary has been in large part produced on television,
and it is in large part Catia TVe’s project to reverse the elite gaze of the
slum chronicler, through the content of its programming and the structure
of its documentaries’ authorship. One important theme in several of the
station’s shows has been to contest the moral terms in which the original
property transgression of barrio communities has been cast. In 2006, the
ECPAI Vencedores (Victors) addressed this question by examining the
meaning of the common word used for slum districts — invasiones — in a
digital documentary called Invasores o Desplazados? (Invaders or Displaced
People?). The film’s first half chronicled a land reform project under way
in the barrios that seeks to regularize land tenancy by granting residents
title to the houses they inhabit, to turn ambiguous “invasions” into legal
ownership. Then, the filmmakers interviewed residents to find out what
they thought of the term invasores, or invaders. All the subjects answered
the question by referring not to tenancy or ownership rights, but to the
years they had spent building their houses and the family roots they had
established in their neighborhood. In other words, the belonging and citizenship in the city that may be legally certified by ownership is, more fun-
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damentally, guaranteed by the labor of home- and community-building,
which alone gives the law its content. 34 For such residents, the barrio was
above all a home, which they had built. In this way, Catia TVe aims to
represent barrio communities engaged in active self-management, rather
than depicting them negatively as social problems or sensational spectacles.
Ricardo Márquez, a Manicomio native who until 2008 served as director
of the station, says, “For fifty years we’ve been passive receptors of media.
And the mass media have broadcast garbage. When they come to a poor
neighborhood they denounce the murders, the criminals, the rapes. But
they’ve never come to document the community organizing itself, the community fighting for its children, the community doing cultural activities.
Nothing. They come to make news that bleeds.”35

Figure 4. Freddy Rodriguez, a boxing coach in the Caracas barrio of Propatria, seen behind him
here. From Freddy Rodriguez, Catia TVe, 2006. Courtesy of Catia TVe.

Civil Society versus the Mob

If one negative version of “populism” describes an underdeveloped political culture dominated by a charismatic leader and his passive clients,
anti-Chávez partisans, on the other hand, have sought to distinguish their
political modernity and democratic agency. A popular term among this
class constituency has been “civil society,” a normally ill-defined concept
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that takes on an unmistakable class definition in its Venezuelan context.
There, it is used to refer to the organized civilian opposition to Chávez.
This is partly in keeping with a popular understanding of civil society as
the “private sphere” of political society — that which is unaffiliated with
and independent of the state. The term “civil society” is imprecise: it is
used ambiguously to refer to constituencies ranging from liberal reformers in former authoritarian Communist countries, to NGOs campaigning against corruption in Latin American governments, to recipients of
USAID grants in occupied Iraq. In his examination of the concept of
civil society in Antonio Gramsci’s work, Joseph Buttgieg argues that
the fall of the Communist regimes of eastern Europe in 1989 augured
a revival of the term; “civil society” became popular in both East and
West as a shorthand for the civic and labor organizations unaffiliated to
the state that challenged Communist dictatorships in eastern Europe. As
the term migrated into other political contexts, the liberal notion of civil
society, Buttgieg charges, often became neoliberal because of its faith in
the liberatory rule of markets and its implicit hostility to government as
inherently authoritarian. In this “neoliberal” formulation, “freedom” is
experienced in privacy; the state is pure coercion. “Civil society,” then,
refers to a neutral zone where social conflict could be peaceably managed, a “bipartisan” space of negotiation, to use a popular term from
U.S. political culture. Buttgieg writes that for Gramsci, on the other
hand, “the site of hegemony is civil society; in other words, civil society
is the arena wherein the ruling class extends and reinforces its power by
non-violent means.” For him, civil society was the “formidable complex
of trenches and fortifications of the ruling class.” From this point of view,
the liberal notion of civil society as an autonomous public space is itself
hegemonic — a nonviolent neutralization of political struggle and a sphere
whose independence is ultimately a fantasy. 36
Venezuelan television has often, in recent years, represented the barrio
and chavismo in terms of explicit disgust and fear. More recently, however,
this tone has been considerably tempered, even if the private media remain
politically hostile to the government. Venevisión, for example, which used to
air some of the most virulently anti-Chávez programming — some of which
was avowedly racist — has ceased all of its political programming. On other
mainstream stations, meanwhile, government spokespeople are now invited
on commercial news programs, and some of the lurid sensationalism of
their barrio news coverage has been modulated. On Globovisión’s Sunday
program, Habla la calle (The Street Speaks), a sociologist commentator —
he could be one of Romulo Gallegos’s characters, had the novelist been
able to imagine modern television — walks through unnamed barrios, comments on social conditions, denounces infrastructural problems, solicits
complaints, dispenses advice, and offers sympathy to the residents there.
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To account for this shift, Duno argues that television media operate
according to a versatile “logic of exclusion,” which vacillates between a
polemic exercise of erasure and an elite populist mobilization of empathy
in constructing a national imaginary around the terms of “civil society”
and “the mob.” Much mass media theory emphasizes the media’s role in
constituting a social consensus around a set of hegemonic concerns. But
Duno considers that in Venezuela, “the imaginary of consensus stops
functioning for a period of time, and a curious exercise of exclusion is put
into practice, operating through stigmatizing representations of a sector of
national life designated as ‘the mob.’ ”37 In Venezuela’s private telev ision,
“civil society” is a flexible concept that is called upon to delineate that
which it is not — the mob. The use and abuse of the concept is useful for
analyzing the antagonistic discourses of citizenship advanced by Catia
TVe and Globovisión, the cable news network.
On 11 April 2002, as the Venezuelan coup was under way, the country’s middle- and upper-class political opposition filled the streets and
television screens of Caracas. Amid live nighttime footage of overwhelmingly white, middle-class protesters celebrating at the east Caracas airstrip
where a plane commandeered by revolting officers had just carried Hugo
Chávez to military detention, a female Globovisión anchor opined that “the
government underestimated civil society,” leading to the final provocation
that caused what then appeared to be the overthrow of the president. The
anchor praised the heroic agency of the protesters while simultaneously urging them to leave the streets, the imagined site of the political confrontation,
and return home: “Go home, you have done enough, civil society. You have
done enough, you in the street. Or, if you are too emotional over what is happening, stay in your house.”38 Civil society is here the autonomous public “in
the street” that can be summoned when needed to correct a wayward state
and then dismissed, lest it get “too emotional.” This address to civil society
was complemented on another channel by a threat to its unseen enemy.
The same evening, a uniformed National Guard officer was interviewed
on RCTV’s evening news program, El Observador. Pointing an index finger
into the camera, the general addressed “chavistas fomenting violence in 23
de enero,” a well-known historic section of Catia: “Don’t turn this situation into a blood bath because the National Guard has the most strength
right now, and we are maintaining peace and tranquility. The same to the
Bolivarian Circles (inaudible): We know where you are.”39 “Civil society” is
maddeningly vague yet in a way extremely precise: civil society is everything
but the “mob,” and one knows it when one sees it. Here, General Bustillos
makes no effort to hide the fact that what Globovisión characterized as
civil society’s decisive intervention at the airstrip was only made possible
by uncivil military intervention — and he suggests that civil society’s safety
will depend on the same state violence it theoretically abhors.
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This discussion of civil society in Venezuela is important to this study
of the politics of television because via mass representations of “civil society” and its antagonists, liberal notions of citizenship can be called upon
to erase the people of the barrio as legitimate social actors and, in moments
of crisis, mobilize violence against them. Whether as passive recipients of
elite expertise and empathy, as in Habla la calle, or as an invisible threat, as
in the general’s threatening gesture on El Observador, the barrio is written
out of “civil society,” which then appears as a more class-bound concept
than it may initially appear. An anecdote from Globovisión’s executive
offices underscores this point: a station official admitted to me in an interview that the station’s intended audience is the middle and upper class.
“The lower classes don’t have the culture for news, only soap operas,” she
added, with an unguarded directness that took me by surprise at the time.
She then proceeded to define civil society as, on the one hand, “society
as such,” the “society that has always existed” throughout the history of
nations; but when pressed to give an example of civil society, she named
the civic organization Súmate, the powerful, staunchly anti-Chávez NGO
that monitors the Venezuelan electoral system. Her definition was revealing
in that it nearly emptied the term of all meaning until “civil society” was
synonymous with “society” itself, yet the term was specific enough in its
colloquial meaning to be identified with the most well-known opposition
organization in Venezuela, one headed, no less, by two white media stars
from elite families. If there is no “outside” to civil society, to what society
does the barrio belong?
Conclusions

Televised media in Venezuela present rival accounts of political citizenship that reflect the divided city. Globovisión claims middle- and upperclass Caracas as its audience, while for Catia TVe, west caraqueños are its
audience, its producers, and its constituency. Globovisión, furthermore,
advances a concept, “civil society,” that defines its audience and the station itself. This concept of civil society has in many ways refined “el
pueblo,” “the people,” the older and still-resonant historical constituency
of Latin American nationalism. As we have seen, however, in mainstream
television and elite political discourse before the rise of chavismo, both
these political concepts have pointedly excluded the barrio, an exclusion
that has accompanied extralegal violence in two major episodes. Yet while
liberal notions of civil society defend a journalistic standard of impartiality, Catia TVe has modeled in its programming and its pedagogical function an activist practice of citizenship in which “the media” are both an
instrument of forming consciousness and a theater of political action in
itself. It is important to note, however, that this mission remains in large
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part aspirational — that is, winning an audience, maintaining a community of ECPAI-producers, and preserving the organic link the station
desires to the poor communities of Catia are difficult tasks made even
harder by bureaucratization that accompanies growth. In addition, the
participatory nature of Catia TVe, like the radical-democratic ideal of
Bolivarianism, must also contend with the sizable, increasingly indispensable personality of Chávez himself.
Catia TVe understands community media as historical in nature; that
is, “vindicating” the barrio as a place of community, militancy, and culture
means representing it as a place with a history worth telling. For founders
like Eekhout, moreover, this project of vindication reflects a long history
of marginalization of the urban poor: exclusion punctuated by periodic
explosions of violence, as in the caracazo. As Duno points out, the “logic
of exclusion” in Venezuela’s private media vacillates between episodes of
racist scorn and instances of populist empathy for, and ultimately symbolic
inclusion of, the urban poor. This tension is contained within the term
“civil society” as it is practiced in Venezuela: it is a class-specific constituency opposed to the state (and by extension the chavista socialist agenda),
but it also claims to represent a broad liberal consensus that transcends
political, racial, and class interests. Politics, at least at a rhetorical level, is
akin to the management of the government bureaucracy, not a battle of
competing interests. The demobilizing logic of civil society applies even to
itself — even while it celebrated the victories of “civil society” on 11 April
2002, Globovisión was urging its soldiers home to their television sets.
Catia TVe, on the other hand, sees its mission as one of consciousness
raising for barrio solidarity and the “revolution,” and it makes no claim
to neutrality.
The station does not compete with the private industry on the field of
content — that is, it does not aspire to disseminate more “positive” images
of barrio residents, in a multiculturalist vein. Instead, it works to transform
the forms and structure of television production. The station’s pursuit of
a nonprofessional, working-class population of producers and its commitment, not only to disseminate different messages than the private media,
but also to look and sound as unlike them as possible — that is, to manipulate the forms of mass communication — are important points for creators
of oppositional media in other countries who seek not only to change media
messages but alter the way people approach and understand the media. In
the United States, on the other hand, Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman’s “propaganda model” of media control, which sought to empirically
prove media bias based on fealty to elite economic and political interests,
has had a lasting impact in Left criticism of the mainstream news media,
at least in the English-speaking world. Herman and Chomsky identify five
“filters” that determine the content of mainstream journalism: ownership
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of media firms, advertising interests, bureaucratic management, the “flak
machines” of rightist pressure groups, and lastly, anticommunism. The two
authors do not use a Marxist critical vocabulary, but they consider the same
question that Gramsci asks in his prison reflections on “hegemony” —
what are the cultural processes by which the ruling class extends its
dominance by consent, rather than coercion? Their methodology, on the
other hand, recalls Louis Althusser’s concept of “ideology.” Ideology,
Althusser wrote, structures the subject’s “imaginary relationship” to the
social relations of production as a natural fact: the way “things are or must
be.”40 This imaginary relationship takes shape in and through “ideological state apparatuses” — the bureaucracies of the government, education,
media, and the like. Chomsky and Herman’s mass-media “filters” are,
like Althusser’s “ideological state apparatuses,” machines for making
compliant subjects. In Manufacturing Consent, the authors argue that the
modern mass media aim to “inculcate individuals with the values, beliefs,
and codes of behavior that will integrate them into the institutional structures of the larger society.”41 This critique of the media, like Althusser’s
analysis of the immanence of ideology, tends to leave the reader feeling
prone and powerless in the face of such an awesome brainwashing machine.
Moreover, Chomsky and Herman only consider the allegedly false content
of the mass media, at the expense of any substantial critique of the forms
that mainstream journalism takes. This oversight is crucial to the deep
pessimism of Chomsky and Herman’s theory — for how can media critics
and rank amateurs ever compete with transnational news corporations on
the level of content?
In its emphasis on the radical importance of form, Catia TVe’s
approach resembles many other Brechtian and Marxist theories of insurgent theater and cinema, from the Soviet Union to the Latin American
“third cinemas.” In his 1969 manifesto, “Towards an Imperfect Cinema,”
Cuban film director Julio García Espinosa argued that Cuban and Latin
American cinema should not imitate the technical mastery of Hollywood
and European film since such aesthetic “perfection” simply separated a
professional caste of filmmakers from the mass of uninitiated viewers. “We
cannot develop the taste of the masses,” he wrote, “as long as the division
between the two cultures continues to exist, nor as long as the masses are
not the real masters of the means of artistic production.”42 Digital technology has made filmmaking more accessible (and more democratic) in
Venezuela today than García Espinosa could have imagined in Cuba’s film
industry in 1969. Catia TVe’s devolution of authorship to nonprofessional
producers without the financial or cultural capital of media professionals and many urban activists separates this movement for “community
media” from the state’s funding of Venezuelan professional filmmakers in
the 1970s and from many of the student and media activist organizations
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in North America and Europe. For example, Indymedia, the most wellknown of these, is politically alternative without being in any real sense
communitarian or popular since it is based in communities with the cultural
and even financial capital (however limited this may be in relative terms)
of radical intellectuals.43
The forms taken by cultural texts help to shape, often without us
fully knowing it, the meanings we ascribe to a particular work of art and
the horizon of possibilities we envision in the social world of which that
work, and ourselves, are a part. Catia TVe argues that mass television in
Venezuela has produced a passive, exclusionary notion of citizenship. This
exclusion is expressed both in occasional mobilizations of violent contempt
and, more recently, in civil performances of “nonpartisan” inclusion. On
the other hand, Catia TVe’s work has shown how impoverished this term
“civil society” has become in its Venezuelan context, where its meaning
comes largely from its ability to define what it is not: “the mob.” In the hills
of far east Caracas, where Catia TVe filmed one of its most often-repeated
programs, the zinc-roofed ranchos and the earth roads flood in the rainy
season, and residents must pack into jeep taxis for the long trek to the city of
glass and concrete below. Yet even there, a resident announced to the Catia
TVe microphone with perfect conviction, “Here, everything is possible.”44
How could a viewer believe him? Limited as they are by technological,
economic, and even geographical barriers, popular media have power, as
we have seen, to challenge both the visual forms and the content of the

Figure 5. A resident of the United Republic of Petare addresses the camera during filming of
Cayapa en la comunidad (Cayapa in the Community), a Catia TVe program recorded in 2004.
Courtesy of the author.
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radio and television programs with which we are daily surrounded. In so
doing, such media might also widen the horizon of possibilities for viewers
and producers in a starkly divided city where real equality can seem as
remote and inaccessible as Globovisión’s gated, multimillion-dollar studio.
Anything, then, might seem possible.
Notes
I am indebted to the people of Catia TVe for their generosity during research for this
article. I am also especially grateful to Naomi Schiller and Luis Duno Gottberg for
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